- Hey, good afternoon, everyone.
Thank you so much for being here today.
I am very excited about today's speaker,
as somebody who focuses on East Asia and Japan,
I'm always eager for people to come talk to us
about this, and so all the more delighted
to have today's speaker with us.
Braving the cold and the ice and everything else
that he has to face on the way,
the growth of Chinese wealth and military power,
as I'm sure you have noticed, has emerged as
the central issue in American foreign policy these days.
And it's obviously got the potential to affect
East Asian security policy; it has the potential to affect
the regional and the global economy.
And all too often, however, we talk about China's rise
in terms of the bilateral context.
We talk about China's rise with respect
to US-China relations.
But other countries, particularly America's
regional partners, are a key part of this story.
And so, today we have the good fortune to discuss
East Asia, by factoring in an important regional player
and US ally, Japan.
Professor Toshihiro Nakayama is a professor
of American politics and foreign policy at Keio University.
And he's also an adjunct fellow at the Japan Institute
of International Affairs.
He's currently spending part of this academic year
as a fellow in the Wilson Center in Washington DC.
Professor Nakayama is the author of several articles
and two books on American foreign policy,
and at the Wilson Center, is working on a project
about American retrenchment and the demise
of the foreign policy consensus
in the American body politic.
Professor Nakayama is a great example
of a highly engaged scholar, with connections
to both diplomacy and the media.
I know him from bilateral study groups
that get together to talk about managing
the US-Japan relationship, and also he was previously
a special correspondent for the Washington Post,
in its Far-Eastern Bureau.
He writes a monthly column for Japan News,
and he is a regular participant in the Japanese media,
analyzing relations between Japan and the United States.
Professor Nakayama also worked for the Japanese mission
to the United Nations in New York.
According to his website, the quote that he would like
to impart to students, belongs to Mark Twain.
The one who doesn't read good books
has no advantage over the one who can't read them.
So now I'm suddenly feeling very guilty
about the stack of books on my nightstand,
back at home, but for all of the insight
he has to share with us today, I'm delighted to introduce
Professor Toshihiro Nakayama.
(applauding)
- Thank you, Professor Lin, I never thought you would
quote the quote that I quoted from Mark Twain.
I was kind of embarrassed, you quoting that.
I'm, I feel guilty myself,
because I have full stacks of books that I haven't read.
But thank you for coming,
and you know, it seems like Dartmouth University
has deep ties with the, ah, with Japan.
I see my friend, Dr. Tsukomoto right there.
I never expected to see him here,
so that was a good surprise.
And in fact, I found out that there's some students
from my university, Keio University, who's visiting here.
As an exchange student, and that's all good.
And you know, before I sort of start my talk,
let me give just a bit about myself.
You know, I teach American politics and foreign policy,
to Japanese university students,
which is a bit, you know, tough task to do these days,
I guess, and it makes it tougher, because I guess
as many of you were, I was totally wrong
about the, sort of the results of the 2016 election,
and on that day, you know, on the election day,
I was on television, talking as though
if the other side would win, but,
so I was kind of embarrassed by it,
and many of my students saw that, you know?
Have seen that on TV, so you know,
of course our job is not about predicting elections, right?
But if you do that on TV and if you're totally wrong,
you sort of have to accept some part of the responsibility.
So, you know, they would come up to me and say:
you were totally wrong, professor.
What can you teach us about American politics?
And so it's kind of tough these days.
But you know, I've been with three universities,
Keio is my third, and then all the three universities
have deep ties with the US, the first university I taught
at was called Tsuda College.
It's the first women's university,
and the founder of the university came to the United States
when she was five, in 1856, or 60, I get that mixed up,
but in the mid 19th century, with a group of Japanese
delegations sent by the government of Japan,
and she stayed, and for Japan to become sort of a modern
nation, she felt the need to establish a woman's college.
Learning from the experiences she had in the United States.
And so, the first university I taught at
had a deep sort of relation with the US.
And the second university that I taught at is called
Ayaba Gapin University, and this university
was established, founded by an American Methodist.
So, it has deep ties.
And Keio University, where I teach,
the founder is one of the sort of,
intellectual sort of founders of modern Japan,
called Kuzawa, and he was the one,
he was the first to translate the Declaration
of Independence, and introduced
the US Constitution to Japan.
So intellectually, I've been very blessed,
and I've been at the sort of, you know,
the important places where, you know,
US Japan sort of relations, not just in terms
of alliance, but in societal and cultural context,
has played a very important role.
So today, I'm going to tackle, you know,
a difficult subject: how we've been navigating
the Trump years it seems, it's only two years,
but it seems a lot longer than that.
And I think we've been pretty successful
in managing that, and I'll try to sort of talk about
the background of how we have been doing that.
And maybe I should start out with the,
sort of the 2016 period, looking back at the Obama years,
right, and Mr. Obama, President Obama,
came out with a policy called Rebalance.
Or, the Pivot, which meant that the US would now
focus on the Asia Pacific, and it was,
there was like five pillars to it.
You know, strengthening relations with allies
and partners, you know, focusing on China,
trade deals, you know, regional sort of mechanisms,
and it was a good list of policy goals,
but policy is, I guess, you know, setting priorities
and from this notion of Rebalance,
it was like a laundry list of what US had to do,
and we couldn't figure out what the priorities were.
It seemed to us that it was a list of assignments
that the US has to accomplish, and where is the core?
And we weren't really ever sure about it.
So although President Obama said that he would focus
on Asia Pacific, we were a bit sort of puzzled,
at least on the receiver's end.
We weren't quite sure what it was.
And also, adding to that, you had,
you know, a situation in Syria, you all know
about the red line debate, right?
The president, Obama said that using of the,
if Assad uses the chemical weapon,
the US would definitely intervene,
but he clearly didn't.
On Ukraine, yes, he was tough on Russia in terms
of the message, and sanctions and all that,
but the perception was that he could have been tougher.
And of course, we totally understand the situation
is different, right?
Because Syria and Ukraine was about new intervention,
whereas the situation in Asia,
and especially managing of the US/Japan alliance,
was more about staying, because the US has always,
already there, right?
So it was more about management and staying power
and all that, but so we understood the difference
between the two situations, totally different.
But it was about the credibility of the president's word,
right, and there were some doubts about that.
And in the background, there was a nervousness,
especially on the policy side, that President Obama
was all about sort of America pulling back.
Right, retrenching, or retrenchment.
So president, or candidate Clinton was running
for the White House, and we thought she would be
a very good partner for Japan, because she would be
appointing the known, you know, foreign policy
and security hands, the establishment.
We saw her as a sort of a tougher version
of President Obama, you know, more about American power,
a robust foreign policy, but not necessarily
about retrenching, especially vis a vis China,
she would be, you know, more tough on China.
At least, that was the expectation.
So we expected an even better relationship,
under Hillary Clinton.
It's not that, you know, the Obama era was totally bad.
You know, it started out really bad because,
on our side, we had a prime minister called Hatoyama.
He was a bit erratic, and he was skeptical
about the alliance, and he even talked about
equilateral, equilateral triangle between US, Japan,
and China, and that didn't make sense to many of us,
at least, that was the vision that he had.
And that sort of started out rocky.
But, I think we've managed through the Hatoyama period
Prime Minister Abe came in for the second time,
and I think, you know, it was a good six, not six,
five or six years, you know, under President Obama
and Prime Minister Abe.
Of course, the symbolic highlight was President Obama's
visit to Hiroshima; I think that was very big,
especially among the Japanese public.
It was like 96 percent of the Japanese pubic appreciated,
and welcomed President Obama's visit.
We never demanded an apology.
It was more about reconciliation,
and sort of remembering the, you know, the tragedy together.
And it, I think it was, for us at least,
the highlight of the Obama presidency.
And there was a reciprocal visit by Prime Minister Abe,
you know, visiting Pearl Harbor.
A Japanese prime minister had never done so.
But it was possible because, you know,
President Obama visited Hiroshima.
So that was, that was good.
And of course, there was this Operation Tomodachi.
This is sort of the disaster relief
from the great east, the earthquake and tsunami
that happened in 2011, and the, you know,
the perception of US forces in Japan were a bit mixed.
You know, some were skeptical,
but the image improved drastically,
after you know, Operation Tomodachi,
the dedication of the men and women of the US Forces
in Japan, you know, gave a very sort of positive
image about them.
So, you know, there were never really chemistries
between the two leaders, Trump and, I mean,
Prime Minister Abe and Mr. Obama.
But things turned out well, many, ah,
Japan undertook many security policy reforms during
Prime Minister Abe's period, and I would say it was
all embraced by President Obama.
Fully supported, right?
So I think we were talking in the context
of US/Japan relations has matured, so that we don't have
to rely on these personal chemistries anymore.
Before, you know, like in the, back in the 1980s,
there was this (speaking Japanese).
That's Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone.
They had, you know, a personal chemistry.
Not like mingling, but they respected each other
for their conservative views, as a nationalist,
in a positive sense, I guess.
And also we have, you know, this, and these two
sort of mingled together, right?
President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi.
You know, when the two visited Graceland,
and you know, Prime Minister Koizumi suddenly
started signing with Elvis's, you're not even
supposed to touch that sunglass, right?
But somehow, he wore those Elvis sunglasses
and started to sing, what was it, Love Me Tender
or some, ah, I forget the song, but,
and so it was all about chemistry,
but if you look at Obama and Prime Minister Abe,
you know, the chemistry is no longer needed.
We can work with the US on a policy level.
So it seemed like the relations matured, right?
So that was through 2016; Obama, you know,
during the Obama/Abe period, it was an accident,
but it was okay, but there was some doubts about
US commitment, and Hilary would be a,
a robust, hawkish version, maybe hawkish
is not the right word, but the robust version of Obama.
So, you know, the better days of US/Japan alliance
was coming, and we almost never talked about, you know,
President Trump; because we didn't think that was happening.
Yes, the fact that he went that far worried us,
because if you treat, you know, Trump as a phenomenon,
it's not really important that he becomes a president.
The fact that he was elected as the, you know,
the candidate of the Republican party itself
meant something, so we knew that we had to be worried
about that side of things, but we never thought
he would become the President of the United States.
And I think that is highlighted in the fact
that when Prime Minister Abe went to New York
to attend the UN General Assembly in September of 2006,
2016, you know, Hillary Clinton sort of invited him
to have a meeting with him, and he accepted that meeting,
I guess, without any hesitation, right?
I guess, I don't know whether Mr. Trump was there,
in New York, at that time, but meeting a prime minister,
meeting a certain candidate is like endorsing one
to another, right, so it was sort of like an intervention.
But I think we didn't really even care,
because we thought, you know, Hillary Clinton
would win the election.
So we found out, of course, the election day,
we were totally wrong, and we went through many
sort of thought processes; what does Trump symbolize?
You know, we've heard of America first,
American nationalism, that he has antagonized
the globalists, and you know, we went into sort
of a deep thinking mode.
And American nationalism is, I think,
about US extending its responsibility too wide.
And you know, and this feeling that US is not going
to provide a public good, or goods,
at the expense of the American people.
And that the US is not going to be exploited anymore,
and also, you know, the multilateral arrangement
is something that constrains the US,
rather than sort of, you know, a forum where sort of,
you know, global norms and rules and treaties
are sort of discussed and agreed upon,
he saw the alliances as a burden,
and saw the treaties and rules, as an encroachment
to US sovereignty, and the message was that,
you know, we're not going to uphold the liberal
international order anymore.
I think that massage was quite blunt.
And needless to say, Japan relies on the alliance,
you know, in a major way, but even more than that,
we rely on this liberal international order, I would say.
You know, Japan does not have the capability to shape
the region in its, you know, in its desirable form.
We tend to react to the situation that's occurring.
And not many countries have the capability
to shape the region in a manner that you want it to be.
There's only a couple of superpowers who can really do that.
And Japan is not in the category.
So in order for the regional, or the regional situation
to be predictable, we do need to rely on this kind
of stable order, which the US has been like the backbone
since the past, you know, since the World War Two ended.
So, you know, not just in terms of the alliance,
but in terms of liberal international order,
we were extremely worried about it.
And looking back, you know, through the campaign period,
you know, it has almost become a ritual for the Japanese
media to complain that Japan is not mentioned
in the speeches of presidential candidates, right?
They would sort of word count, you know,
how many times China was mentioned,
and how many times Japan was mentioned.
China is always like 20, 30,
and Japan is like zero or one.
And we would be, you know, criticizing that,
this is a very silly thing, but it has almost
become a ritual in doing that.
But you know, Mr. Trump was totally different right?
He never forgot to speak about Japan,
in terms of trade, that Japan is,
he lumped China and Japan together as a free-rider,
and he always talked about Japan relying on
the US/Japan alliance, and not paying,
and if you wanna be protected, you have to pay, right?
That was the blunt message that he was sending us.
And also, this is only one, so maybe we shouldn't be
sort of focusing on this too much,
but he said Japan can go, not just Japan, he said Korea
and Germany and lumped together some other countries,
but he said that Japan can go nuclear, if you want.
Now that's a very, you know, a delicate message,
and it touches at the heart of the alliance as well,
right, the extended deterrence.
So, we were quite shocked, naturally.
But you know, there's a famous, well known,
you know, Singaporean ambassador, scholar,
called Vera Hari Kashkan, and he wrote after,
you know, President Trump was elected,
that in Asia, we don't complain.
We try to adapt.
And he was talking about the Trump administration.
And I think in a way Japan went even further
than that, and I would say it was a radical adaptation
to Mr. Trump and his policies.
I would think it would have been very difficult
to do this in Europe.
Prime Minister May, you know, President Macron
and Chancellor Merkel could never have done
what Japan did, I think.
And I think there are several reasons behind that.
And I will add that, you know, Prime Minister Abe's
decision to radically adapt to the Trump Administration
was I would say, generally was and is,
generally supported by the Japanese public.
And the reason is that, you know,
the first one is pretty straightforward.
But if you think about the security situation
in northeast Asia and what Japan can actually do
to counter or deal with these trends.
I'm talking about China, alright?
Everybody in northeast Asia, for that matter,
everybody around the world is worried,
concerned, interested, in China's rise.
The situation that we're in is very different
from Europe, because yes, Europe is facing not the rise,
but you know, a threat, I can't come out with the right
word, it's, ah, the uncertain aggressiveness of Russia.
That's a worry for many European countries,
but Russia is not a surging or rising power, okay?
And also, if you look at Europe,
France, UK, Germany, they have friends,
they have multilateral institutions.
So yes, US is indispensable, right,
in terms of managing NATO, the US has to be there.
But you look around, you share many countries
who almost, you more or less share the same kind
of worries about Russia.
And I think it's a bit different in the case
of northeast Asia, because we don't, and I would add
that many or most of the countries in Asia,
northeast Asia and beyond, including southeast Asia,
is worry about China's rise, concern that they may have
hegemonic ambitions, and if you pile up
what China is doing, you may see an ambition
of building a China-centric order.
But there's another perception that, you know,
especially these smaller and mid-size countries,
that since you can't shape China's rise,
then you might as well adapt to it.
Don't fight with them.
There's that kind of a, although they are worried,
they are at the same time, you know,
faced with a very serious choice,
or no choice, of simply adapting to China's rise.
But Japan is not in that category.
I would say it is the, maybe the only country
who is explicitly saying that China-centric order
is not desirable in the northeast Asia
or Asia Pacific region, and we would resist to that.
If we see that, you know, kind of order assertion.
But the thing is, you know, we can't do that alone, right?
It's almost impossible, so we need a partner.
So that partner is the United States.
And I think there is a general understanding and support
about that; there's an interesting poll,
conducted by the Cabinet Office of Japan,
if you ask the state of the US/Japan relations today,
excellent and good, if you add those two categories,
last year it was 84.4 percent, pretty high,
and this year, I'm sorry, in 2017, it was 84.4.
Pretty high.
And in 2018, it dropped quite significantly, 10 percent,
74.3 percent, which is still high.
But there you can show that Japanese people
are a bit worried about American commitment to the region,
but the next polling is, you know, if you ask the people
in Japan for the future shape of the region,
how important is the US/Japan relationship?
In 2017, it was 95.1 percent.
And in 2018, it was 94.5 percent.
Almost identical, right?
And a number over 90 percent, two years in a row,
in fact it goes much longer, is not a number
what you get in a democracy, right?
So the importance of relations with the US is, I would say,
near consensus in Japan.
So people understand that no matter who the president is,
you somehow have to deal with him or her.
So that's the consensus.
The second element that, you know,
the Prime Minister Abe decided to adapt to Mr. Trump,
and the reason why the Japanese public supported it,
was sort of the lack of populism you see
in other Western democracies.
Professor Lin has written an excellent article
on that in Asia Pacific Review.
If you see the, close to anger among the leaders
in the UK, France, and Germany,
it's not simply about, you know,
president tweeting and making policies at the same time.
I think they see sort of the darker side of what
Mr. Trump represents, right?
It resonates with AFD, Alternative for Germany,
they resonate with the PEN, to a certain degree.
It resonates with Brexit, and all these people
in the UK, Germany, and France, who support these
negative nationalist, populist tendency,
are in support of Mr. Trump.
And sort of vice-versa to a certain degree.
So, those leaders in Europe are really disturbed
by what Mr. Trump represents, and the fact
that he doesn't criticize them, right?
But in Japan, we see none of that.
None of, you know, this, of course,
we're a democracy, you know?
There's fringe elements who make very nationalistic
messages and populist messages and all that.
They do exist, but is there a major trend towards that?
There isn't, right?
The reason is mixed, I guess, because Japan is
a homogenous society; we have a border, or a wall,
in the form of a sea, right?
No one can just swim across the Sea of Japan
and come to Japan, or for that matter,
the whole Pacific Ocean, you know,
it's almost impossible, right?
So, and also there's other elements, I guess.
In the political sphere, social media is not that active.
In the private and the social sphere, it is.
People tweet and we have our own,
not our own, it's a Korean thing,
but it's called Line, which is a social network service.
Really popular among the younger generation.
But it somehow hasn't penetrated the political sphere,
the public sphere, and people actually do read
the newspaper; yes, the publication of the newspapers
are going down, but if you compare with the other countries,
the number of people who read the newspaper
is still quite high, although the newspaper companies
are really worried about the decline.
So, this lack of populism makes Japan
unaware of the darker side of, you know, Mr. Trump.
Not that we don't care, but more we don't really
realize that danger, okay?
And the third is, I don't mean any offense,
but you know, Mr. Trump, to many Japanese,
is your typical American, right?
It's what you see on TV, movies and all that.
Again, no offense, but maybe arrogant, loud, brash,
and that's, in a way a good side of the US,
but a negative side, so a person who knows American society
would be surprised, people who have lived
in the states would be surprised that Mr. Trump was elected,
but of course, quite naturally, many of the Japanese
have never lived in the United States,
so they would think that Mr. Trump is a typical American.
And lastly, the reason why we supported Prime Minister Abe's
decision to adapt to Mr. Trump is a contrast
with President Obama; I've sort of touched
on this a little bit at the outset.
That we always accept a tough leader, in you know,
in supreme, or the commander in chief of the United States.
And President Obama was never a tough commander.
At least in our perception.
If you look at the, US, the White House has to come out
with a document called: National Security Strategy.
And the National Security Strategy of 2015 was,
there was a term in the cover letter which says that,
you know, the strategic patience is the mode
that the US has to be in.
And if you read the documents, you know,
those policy document goes this way and that way,
has many messages, but the message that it sort of,
you know, made an impression on us,
was that American primacy is no longer a solution
to the kind of problem that the US is facing.
It's, in a way, true, to deal with pandemics
and global warming, American primacy is not the answer.
And he thought, you know, issues like pandemics
and global warming are an existential threat to
the United States, and to human kind.
And never treated the rise of China or Russia
as an existential threat.
It was a threat, but so that's why people sometimes
call him a post modern president, right?
And intellectually, I think that makes sense,
to a certain degree, but for many of the Japanese,
and many who live in northeast Asia.
Yes, pandemics, global warming is something
that's really important.
We have to sort of deal with it,
but in northeast Asia, what we're facing
is a modern situation; clash of nations.
Alright, China's rise, North Korean nuclear weapons.
When you're faced with those kind of issues,
the intellectual sophistication
of President Obama wasn't convincing.
And the message that, at least, it was mixed,
because we weren't sure how he was gonna approach China,
we're not sure if he's even interested
in nuclear weapons in North Korea, but that made us think
that maybe we couldn't rely or we weren't
fully convinced with President Obama's message.
Maybe we can somehow manipulate Mr. Trump.
So that was the expectation; and also the personal chemistry
between Prime Minister Abe and Mr. Trump helped a lot.
I mean, this is, I guess, almost against
the diplomatic protocol, but Prime Minister Abe
visited president-elect, not even two weeks after,
it was 11 or 12 days after the presidential election,
he visited him in Trump Tower.
And talked about the coming presidency.
I hear that the Obama White House was extremely
unhappy with it, because it is
against the diplomatic protocol.
You only have one president.
And the Japanese prime minister is not supposed to
have a talk with a president-elect.
But I know he did it anyway.
We have, I think, fairly managed the relations pretty well.
But if you think about the other options
that Japan may have, just think of the possibilities,
you could sort of, or you would understand,
why Japan sort of tried to adapt to Mr. Trump,
in that radical mode.
Because I think there's like five other options
that you can think of.
Some may not be realistic, but you know,
sort of a brainstorming mode.
You could choose the pacifist route, right?
Which is actually in our constitution, article nine.
No more alliance, we're gonna get rid of the, our sort of,
military capabilities and become a pacifist nation.
But that's almost out of the question.
I mean, no one today would support that idea.
It's even irresponsible, right?
Disarming yourself totally in northeast Asia
would create a vacuum that would sort of bring
in a conflict, so no serious person would support that.
Then what about Japan becoming a full-blown military power?
That's also not supported among the Japanese public.
Where's the money?
There's no money for that, and there's no political will.
And the political class and the politicians
would never try to convince Japanese people
into that direction, because it's almost out
of the question; that's not possible.
Going nuclear, some people talk about it,
but it's unrealistic.
Maybe some other allies, other than the United States.
We've been working on sort of, what we call
the networking of the alliances.
We've been trying to establish or deepen the connection
between the US allies in the regions, like Australia,
India is not an ally but a potential partner,
that's becoming much more important.
Even, you know, France, we have a foreign minister
and a defense minister meeting, which is called
Two Plus Two, and the UK, which is feeling a bit
lonely these days, they want, we're even talking
about the alliance.
We had a good alliance, before the war,
with the UK, so the UK is sort of hinting that.
But, would the Indian navy come to help us
in defense of our territories in the East China Sea?
That's unthinkable, right?
Only the US forces would be willing to do that.
There's some question.
So, other allies is not a realistic option.
Maybe some regional organizations?
There are regional organizations in our region,
but you know, some people talk of them as though
if it is only a talk show.
It doesn't really go into the substance,
and the difficult matters.
There's the global organizations, the UN and the
UN security council, and that is supposed to uphold
the norms, and global order and all that,
but quite naturally, China is the only one
in the Security Council as a permanent member
with a veto power in it.
We've been trying to become a permanent member
since the early 1990s, we've been raising hand
every year, all the time, but China and some others
have been really successful in avoiding that.
So, that's also not a possibility.
So as a result of that, it's quite natural
for the Japanese people to think that the US option
is the only option we have.
But the lucky thing for us is that, yes it is
the only option, but it's the best option, I guess.
So that's why, you know, more than 90 percent
of the people think that, you know, relations
with the United States is critically important.
But I think you can say the same thing
in a different way, that it's the best choice
for the US, as well.
For the US to thrive, and of course, transatlantic relations
are always important; you know, that's where US
sort of started out, you know?
But in terms of trade, economy and all that,
it's nice to go to Europe and have wine, cheese,
and go to museums, but that's not where
the real economic dynamisms are.
It's in Asia Pacific, east Asia.
So, it's good for the US to be there,
but the thing is, you've been functionally part
of east Asia since maybe late, you know,
19th century, definitely from the early 20th century.
But you're not physically present there.
So you would need a partner there.
You would have potential, you know, many potential partners.
You have forces in Korea, Philippines, Thailand,
Singapore, although it's down under, further away,
Australia, they have fought in every war you have fought.
But they're a bit too down under, south, right?
And South Korea, they have this strain of, ah,
you know, anti-American sentiment.
Philippines, the same, you have a president like Duterte,
it's a bit, you know, Trump-ier than Mr. Trump himself.
So, Japan is a stable democracy.
We have successfully managed the alliance for more than,
or close to 70 years.
And there are no major sort of anti-base movements.
There was some, and of course, there are some,
you know, issues in Okinawa.
Local frustration is there, but in terms
of national sentiment, this anti-base movement
is almost non-existent, since the mid-70s.
So it's been almost 40 years since we've last had
the major movement, social movement in countering
the US presence.
And we also share the desirable shape of regional order.
So I think, no doubt, it's the best power for the US,
er, best option for the US.
So it's for Japan, adapting to Mr. Trump wasn't
all that controversial, but I guess the question is,
is will America sort of still remain to be
an upholder of, ah, regional order,
liberal international order, and would America still
pursue sort of American primacy?
If you lose interest in that, you know,
the alliance or the relations with the US
wouldn't stop, stop making sense,
even in the Japanese context.
So what worries us the most, and this is counter-intuitive,
but sort of the continuity between Obama and Trump.
I make this argument in Washington and nobody likes this.
And when I talk to the Trump people,
they would say, oh, we're not like Obama.
And of course, when I talk to the Obama people:
don't equate us with Trump, right?
But I'm sort of doing this as an argument, to make a point.
And so if you distill three core agendas
of Obama's foreign policy, it was about,
you know, asking allies and partners to do more, right?
And in fact, the reason why Japan took a,
a sort of reformation, security reform,
in 2012-13 period, was yes, it was about China,
it was about North Korea, but it was also about
the US commitment.
We weren't quite sure about the US commitment.
So they all thought we would beef up what we can do
in the national security area, and try to convince
the Americans that we have done our maximum,
within our legal framework, so you have to be committed
to the region as well.
We could never say this publicly,
because if we say that, people would start saying:
even Japan doesn't trust the United States, right?
But that was sort of like the hidden message.
So we literally felt that, I think.
And of course, this two percent defense spending,
you know, NATO partners are on,
that Mr. Trump is making noise all the time,
this is not a Trump agenda, but an Obama agenda.
In fact, it started out in the Bush Administration,
but so, demanding allies and partners to do more,
that was a clear vision of the Obama foreign policy.
And the second, and maybe this is the core
of the Obama agenda: no more unneeded intervention.
And that US should basically pull back,
and focus more on the United States.
That would be the third element, right?
Nation-building at home.
So I think that's the three pillars of the Obama
foreign policy agenda, and I'm not saying
Trump and Obama is totally the same,
because you know, in terms of issues
like Global Warming, how you deal with the UN,
those are totally different, right?
But these three pillars that I talked about,
demanding allies and partners to do more,
no more intervention, and nation-building at home.
I think it totally overlaps with what Mr. Trump wants,
as well, in the case of Mr. Trump,
nation-building is about building walls
and sort of, you know, pushing back unwanted elements
to enter into the country, so it's,
and in the case of President Obama it was Obamacare.
So it's totally different, but sort of the direction,
or at least the message, you could make an argument
that there are some continuities.
And if there are continuities between these two
very different presidents, one I may call him
a smart retrencher, Obama understood the negatives
of America retrenching, so he tried to fill the void
with, you know, the notion of global governance
and you know, sort of America being proactive
in multilateral sort of organizations,
and in the case of trump, he was just blunt and said:
we're gonna pull out; we're not gonna do this anymore.
So there's many differences, but at least on our side,
there seems to be a continuing thread between
the two very different presidents.
So if that is so, if that is a larger tendency,
that you know, the American society as a whole
is heading, that would be a great challenge for Japan.
Because without the US commitment,
and US commitment to uphold liberal international order,
in our region, the alliance won't function as we hoped.
So, I don't think we're at that stage yet.
We're sort of feeling, or we're becoming a bit nervous,
but you know, people are talking about it.
But for now, even under Mr. Trump,
what we're focused on is trying to convince
the Americans that you have to be a resident power.
We will sort of try to uphold our responsibilities,
and that element has been almost totally what we'd been
doing in the Obama Administration.
So yes, I said there was a radical adaptation,
but it isn't all that different.
And I think that is unique to Japan.
You don't see that in Europe,
so that's how we sort of managed and navigated through,
and we're still navigating through it,
and we don't know whether we would successfully do that
for four years, and who knows, if it's eight.
But we've been, I think, quite successful,
quite successful in managing that.
So, that would be the end of my talk.
Thank you very much.
(applauding)
Sorry for, I went on a bit too long.
Apologies for that.
- Alright, just have a seat and we'll take some questions.
Here, can you sit on that side?
Yeah.
Okay.
I'm gonna grab the first question, to get us going.
So I wanted to follow up on a theme that you mentioned
about China's, like a China-centric order,
and you talked about the theme of international order
and how important it was to Japan that this international
liberal order is upheld, and the fear that the United States
is no longer as interested and committed to upholding
that order, and also that the notion of a China-centric
order and what that would entail
and how it would be different, and alarming to Japan,
so can you give us some insight in terms of what are
Japanese people saying about the direction of China's
leadership, and why do you see that as not in your interest?
- Right, well first of all, I think I said,
in my remarks, that Japan, in a certain context,
would feel lonely, because we would be the only one
who explicitly resists, you know, China-centric order.
So if, and if you pile up what China is doing,
in South China Sea, you know, East China Sea.
Even some domestic arrangement, you know,
with the social media and all that,
you feel the dangers of that.
We're not quite sure what kind of order that is,
but what we're saying is that we have to be fully
aware of the negative side of China-centric order,
and if we see that kind of order,
it would most likely be that Japan would feel
quite possibly isolated, because,
and if you add an American retrenchment in that picture,
you know, the smaller countries have no option
but to adapt, to the China-centric order.
So, we would be relatively alone,
in resisting that kind of order.
So that's sort of like the worst-case scenario.
But in more practical terms, you know,
East Asia has recovered, or has developed,
precisely because this open and liberal,
market-based liberal order,
and China, in fact, has benefited there.
- So has China. - Right.
So, they should be the ones who should be sort of upholding
that kind of order, by they see liberal international order
as a euphemism, right?
They think it's an American order.
And I was having some discussion with Chinese colleagues
in Beijing, and I sort of, without any thinking,
because I use the term all the time,
I used the term liberal international order,
without precisely defining them,
and they accused me of, you know, not to use that word,
because that is an American-led order.
And we don't like that.
So, Japan benefited, and in fact, we rose within that order.
And we feel comfortable in it,
and we think it's good for the region,
so the fact that that order is being eroded
is bad for us, bad for the region.
So that's the kind of argument that I was trying to make.
- So are things like, you mentioned the South China Sea,
so the going against maritime law, for example,
the militarization of islands and the doubt
that that would cast on the freedom of navigation,
of freedom of movement of goods throughout the region.
You mentioned the social media,
are you talking about their own treatment of--
- Their own people, and how that would extend outward.
Possibly.
We don't know.
So, it's not gonna be a rule-based, you know,
region or area if a China-centric order really emerges.
So, we, at least our notion is that we have to resist
and push back, but unfortunately, we can't do that alone.
Collectively, we should be partnering with many
other countries in the region, but of course,
as many of us know, southeast Asia,
although they are very worried about China's rise,
their position is: don't make us choose
between China and US and Japan, right?
They wanna be in the middle, because for them,
the term that they use is geography is a fate.
You can't move China, but America can always pull back.
And we cannot fully rely on the US.
And Japan cannot single-handedly cope with the situation.
So, they, they themselves are
in a precarious situation, I think.
- Very true.
Why don't we take some questions from our folks back here.
So I see, right back here in the last row, yeah?
(muttering)
- [Attendee] Thank you so much for the talk--
- Sorry, I guess we're passing a microphone around.
- [Attendee] You talked about how it's important
for Japan to kind of strengthen the relationship
with the US and also diversify the, like,
ally relations with other countries.
And you briefly talked about South Korea
and the relationship between Japan and South Korea,
but I feel like to me, even though all the historical
things that happened between Japan and South Korea,
it would be hard for, now, for Japan and South Korea
to be kind of close, but I feel like it feels to me
it'd be beneficial for both if Japan is really against
a China-centric order, since South Korea is also
a US ally, wouldn't it be beneficial for both,
and especially Japan to kind of get close to Korea
to kind of, I guess, hinder the rise of China.
But the current situation between the two
doesn't seem like it's going that way,
but further and further away from being close.
So I would like to hear from you about your personal
opinion about the future of the two relations.
- I totally agree with your analysis,
that most of us would understand the importance of,
you know, good relations between US, I mean, Korea,
RoK and Japan, and there wast his term,
quite often used back in the late 1980s,
the virtual alliance.
There's, RoK is an ally to the US,
and Japan is an ally to the US,
so why not sort of try to forge a trilateral,
not a formal alliance, but a virtual alliance,
so that we can work together, so that was the ambition.
But nobody talks about that anymore.
And there are many reasons behind that,
and some are very emotional, but some are, I think,
more strategic in nature, I think,
because that would sort of relate to what I said,
answering to Professor Lin's question,
you know, everybody in the region is worried
about China's rise, and trying somehow to cope with it.
And of course, South Korea is worried,
or concerned, about how they would adapt to China.
And I think their understanding is that they can balance
between their relations with China
and their relations with the US.
But if you bring in the Japanese part of it,
for their future in east Asia, I think they see China
as much more significant than Japan is.
I'm not saying that there is a consensus on that,
but a large portion of the Korean public
are seeing Japan in that light.
And this is an if situation, so I don't know
whether it would make sense, because you know,
Japan's population is going down quite significantly,
right, now we have like 100 million people,
but it would go down to like 90 million, to that range,
in the coming future, and if we see a unified Korea,
it would be a very rocky period, I think,
but the population would be somewhere like 60 million people
or a bit less or a bit more than that.
So in terms of the size of a nation, it would be
more or less the same, and I think the competition
would be more fierce between Japan and Korea.
And of course, in the process of unification,
I'm sure they would, the Koreans would use the Japan card,
because the easiest thing that you can do to unify
a people is to say: that person is bad, right?
I mean, we do that in the elementary school,
and we do that at the nation level as well.
It's kind of sad, but that's how it goes.
And so, on the, and as a result of, (muttering)
as a result of all that, we used to talk about
our feeling towards Korea, because all those talks
about reconciliation, apologies, always doesn't work out,
partly because of them, partly because of our fault.
You know, we quite often talk that we have a decree
in fatigue, okay, we're tired of it, right?
But nowadays, people talk of distrust towards
the Korean people.
I hope that will recover.
But when our defense minister was in Washington recently,
he talked about potential new partners
in terms of, you know, security.
He met, and he talked about Australia,
he talked about India, UK, France,
without mentioning South Korea.
So, intellectually, I do agree with what you said.
That it's critically important, but it seems like
it's not going toward the direction,
and it's difficult to imagine a situation
where you know, this three alliance,
or the three countries would function
in a very productive way.
It's kind of sad, but it's, I think, where we're at.
- [Moderator] More questions, yeah, back here.
- I actually have a similar question about another regional
sovereign power, and that is like, Taiwan,
because Taiwan is a US, you know, ally, kind of.
- [Nakayama] I guess: partner.
- Yeah, partner, I'd say, who's also shown resistance
to the rise of China, and you know, obviously has
ties with Japan, how do Japanese people see
the Taiwan/Japan relationship continuing in the future,
in opposition to China, because US/Taiwan relations
is definitely a thorn in China's side.
So I just wanna know what the Japanese opinion is on Taiwan.
- Well, in terms of, you know, person to person,
people to people ties, I think, you know,
the affinity towards the Taiwan people in Japan,
and vice-versa, is quite strong.
You know, like, many of my friends,
colleagues, love going to Taiwan.
And there are some issues, between you know,
Taiwan and Japan, but it isn't really all that serious,
so and of course the fact that we share,
you know, a concern about the rise of China
helps the relation as well.
But in terms of political and foreign policy
and security sphere, we are much more cautious
than the United States.
I was at one senator's event, a Republican,
very conservative, hawkish type,
and this was an open event, so I, you know,
there was a participant from Taiwan media,
and he asked this senator: are you going to support
President Tsai delivering a speech at the joint session
of Congress?
And he said: definitely.
I would support her fully.
That doesn't mean that's gonna happen,
but in Japan, I mean, we try to sort of handle the situation
in a more quiet manner and not try to sort of arouse
Chinese anger too much.
So, there's a difference in tone in how we approach
the issue itself, but in terms of, like I said,
people to people relations, it's quite,
it's nothing like what we have with Korea,
or you know, mainland China.
It's totally different.
It's good, I would say, and I think people in Taiwan
demand us to do more.
But that's kind of politically delicate,
and you know, I don't think there will be
a significant movement on that front.
- Yeah, ah, Rachel.
- [Attendee] Hi, thank you so much for coming.
I was just wondering about Japan and the Japanese public's
reaction to China's more soft power rise,
especially to programs like the BRI and to institutions
like the AIIB, and if there's a sense of a loss
of financial opportunity that goes in with those,
or possibly an attempt to counteract those sort of policies?
- Well thank you.
In terms of BRI and AAIB, initially,
I think the Japanese government, Japanese people,
for that matter, was extremely worried,
because of the, you know, the financial power
that it seemed to have, and seemed to back
the whole program up, and we saw that as a tool
for realizing Chinese hegemonic ambitions, right?
So we were extremely worried.
But it turns out, it's been a couple of years
since the program was launched,
it has an element of the paper tiger in it.
It's not as effective as it seemed.
Many of the project and initiatives that launched
under the banner of BRI is stuck.
So I think the position of the Japanese government
is that in a place where we can cooperate,
like infrastructure building, I mean,
we would be willing to do so.
So that, I think, extreme worry is more or less toned down.
And that sort of resonates with the Japanese position
on China, these days, that the two nations
are trying to come together, not totally amend,
but at least, I mean, for the past seven or eight years,
Japan-Sino relation was really bad, right?
Mainly because of the territorial issues,
but much more than that, but I think there's
an understanding on both sides that maybe we should
start to sort of cool off a bit.
And now, and Prime Minister Abe visited Beijing last year,
and President Xi is supposed to visit Japan early summer.
So I think we're in a direction where,
we're not gonna become friends or anything.
On the security front, there are many issues
that, you know, we have to resist and, you know,
and stand firm.
But in areas that we can cooperate,
I think there's a mood in Tokyo that we might,
or we should cooperate with China.
But that means sometimes, because of the recent,
you know, US hard stance on China,
maybe some of you have heard President Pence's speech
in Washington, the Hudson Institute,
really tough on China, treating it almost as an adversary.
Not a competitor even, an enemy or an adversary.
That's how China was treated in the Mike Pence speech.
And we always demanded US that you have to be tough
on China, because sometimes it seemed like, you know,
especially like, during the first years
of the Obama Administration, it seemed like,
at least, from our point of view,
they were trying to engage China without being tough.
Trying to shake hands with (muttering),
at least that's how it seemed.
So we always kept saying that China is,
with, whether it's hegemonic ambitions,
you have to be careful.
We've been saying that all the time,
and the Americans would say: we understand that,
don't overreact, watch what we're doing.
We're also tough.
But now we're in a situation, you know,
be careful what you wish for, you just might get it.
And US seems to be approaching China in a really tough way.
Like I said, even as an adversary.
And we don't want to see US and China fighting
all the time; maybe, you know,
war is the last thing we want, right?
So, we're now a bit worried about that.
You know, the other worry that we're facing recently.
- So the rhetoric has definitely shifted,
so you're talking about--
- [Nakayama] In Japan?
- The, no, in the US, with Vice President Pence's speech,
and then of course, there's the trade war,
and so we see actual policy changes.
Are there other things that are sure
to alarm the Japanese?
- What, well, what struck me,
listening to the Mike Pence speech,
was that it sort of resembled the X Article,
of George Kennan, in that, because George Kennan
was making the argument that Russia, or the Soviets,
is penetrating us, and they're trying to sort
of undermine the US from within.
And that wasn't precisely George Kennan's message.
He was more, he's a Russian expert,
he understood where Russia is,
so it was about: don't overreact,
we should wait for its own demise.
But the reason why it penetrated the American
foreign policy establishment was the penetration metaphor.
That Soviet is undermining the US from within.
And the Pence speech had the same kind of logic.
That China is not just out there, being dangerous.
It's penetrating our society.
It's stealing our technology from within.
And we have to get rid of that and counter that.
So that resemblance in logic was, I think,
very interesting, and some people say that we shouldn't
be using the word cold war to describe China/US relations
today, but I think, in a way, it makes sense.
Because in the media, when people use the term
cold war, they treat it as though the next stage
is the hot war, right?
So we're not at that stage, so just avoid using
the term cold war, but the term cold war was not about that,
it was about realizing that hot war is impossible,
or very difficult, because of the nuclear weapons, right?
And especially in the 1970s, it was about managing
a very difficult relation with a country
which you can never become friends with.
So maybe the cold war analogy is precisely the term
you might need, because realistically speaking,
the US and China is not going to be, like, buddies.
That's just extremely difficult, right?
So it's gonna be a difficult partner.
So we should realize that and try to stabilize that.
At the same time, avoid war at any cost.
So in that context, I think the term Cold War Two
really makes sense.
- To the extent that it's referring to intensification
of the competition that we're seeing,
I think it's applicable.
This is being very roundly debated in international politics
these days with many people saying this is
a really imprecise analogy and of course,
there's a lot of, many differences with the Cold War.
The extent of economic globalization
and interdependence, for example.
The interconnectedness of the US and Chinese societies,
so there's many, many differences,
but there is certainly more intense competition
that we're starting to see.
And so, in that respect, we do see some similarities.
Yeah, right here.
- Thanks very much for your comments.
Given the somewhat erratic American policy in Asia,
and the longer-term trend towards populism,
let's say it goes on for another five or 10 years,
plus the greater importance of Asia, economically,
versus North America, is there a, you mentioned
five different doors; is there a door number six?
Where is it in Japan's interest, perhaps,
to go down a, what I call a Switzerland strategy
or even a Finland-ization strategy,
where China-centric is gonna be the reality.
Let's cozy up to that early, shape it,
sort of like the debate between the UK and the EU.
Should I be inside and influencing it,
or on the outside pushing it back?
- Yes, I think there's, you know, the other thing
would be the people who's managing the alliance
are called alliance managers, some people call it
the alliance mafia, because they're so closed, right?
Like the gangs.
And Professor Lin is in there, I guess.
- [Moderator] Are we in that?
I was just thinking that.
We're not closed; they let me in, for goodness sake.
- Oh, you were up for inclusion a long time ago.
But anyway, so the mindset of this security mafia,
especially on the Japanese side,
is to stop thinking beyond the alliance.
Because there isn't any, right?
So to become a card-carrying member of the security mafia,
just don't think about it, because it doesn't make sense.
(muttering)
What's that?
(muttering response)
Okay, okay.
But in a way, that made sense for Japan.
For precisely the reason I explained.
I mean, it's nice to think about, speculate about,
beyond the alliance, but realistically,
there isn't any, so just stop thinking about it.
And initially, I think this, you know,
don't think beyond mentality was an intellectual sort of,
you know, it was intentionally done.
So it was a decision not to think about it.
But now, people don't even realize
that they stopped thinking beyond the alliance,
so it has almost become routine.
And some people do criticize the security
mafia's insistence on not thinking beyond the alliance
as unrealistic in the age of populism,
in the age of Trump, but in a short term,
I still agree that there is no option beyond the alliance,
so what I would say is that, so Japan is a,
it's kind of sad to say this, but Japan is a country
without plan B.
We do have sort of like plan A dash, okay?
And that's yes, we would focus on the alliance,
and that would never change, but that doesn't mean
that we would follow everything the US does.
We would, as we did, we kept the TPP alive.
Although we're not, you know, what do you call it?
We're not a member of the JCPOA, we think that arrangement
is critically important, and we're pretty vocal about it.
That's the same with the Paris Agreement,
EPA with the EU, that's critically important.
We're very sort of active in multilateral diplomacy,
development.
So those issues that we would handle.
We would not like, follow everything the US does.
And that's been a constant, I mean, that's been the same.
And in a way, Japan have developed a peculiar kind
of realism, sort of trying to manage the US/Japan relations.
You know, you've been always a bigger partner, way bigger.
So the Japanese people have learned to adapt to this,
this partner, and not feeling, what do you call it,
that negative about it.
I mean, it's a fact of life.
You have to adapt to it.
So, I mean, if it's another country,
I mean, you would feel sort of like an emotional
frustration in trying to adapt to the US.
But you know, we've become numb in a way,
or you can call that a realism.
And there's a term, (speaking Japanese)
that's like, I mean: you'd have to accept it.
That's the Japanese term for: you'd have to accept it.
So I call that (speaking Japanese) realism, right?
We have to deal with it.
So that sentiment is still strong,
but like you said, if the populism trend continues
and if we have a sophisticated Trump,
or if we have really progressive, you know,
on the left side, president who's not interested
in upholding, you know, liberal international order,
you, I'm sure Senator Sanders is not too,
you know, enthusiastic about US
playing a positive role abroad.
And that might be even more, you know,
a worse nightmare for Japan.
So each of the possibilities, but as of now,
we shouldn't overreact to it and what we should be doing
is to demand US, like I said, made remarks that we should
demand US to be a resident power,
and that's precisely the role that we're being
demanded by our friends in the region.
Japan would be the most effective nation to convince
the Americans that: you're important,
and you have to be here.
And as of now, at least at the policy level,
we don't see any of that.
But there are worries in American body politic,
because in a way, Mr. Trump's message is resonating.
The fact that you've been sort of responsible
for liberal international order
since the end of the Cold War,
and people expected that liberal international order
would converge, that China would join in,
Russia would join in, and the end of history, right?
But that's not the way it's turning out,
and I think the sentiment is that:
do we still have to do this?
I guess that sentiment is quite strong,
and it goes way beyond the core Trump supporters.
- [Moderator] America has some fatigue of its own, maybe?
- Right, yeah, so we're worried about that.
But we can't do much about that, right?
Just keep on convincing.
- Do we have more questions, I think, Linda?
(murmuring)
Yeah, go ahead right there.
- In this week's Economist, they have an article
talking about the islands off northern Japan
that are now occupied by Russia, right?
And it mentions that there have been 25 meetings
between Putin and Abe.
You haven't mentioned much about Russia's role
in the region; could you say a few words on that?
- Sure.
Well, you know, in foreign policy terms,
there are some legacy agendas that Prime Minister Abe
is trying to pursue.
You know, abduction issue in North Korea is one.
Sort of constitution reform, which I don't think
it's gonna happen, is another,
and the third is the Northern Territory issue, with Russia.
And yes, they've met 25 times.
Is it 25?
Yeah, something around that, yeah.
And you know, and among the conservatives,
getting back the Northern Territory is one
of the core agendas, because territorial issues is always,
always an emotional issue.
You know, not many people understand the strategy
behind what Prime Minister Abe is doing,
and frankly, I don't understand that either.
It's, Russia has been using sort of like a double,
I might get in trouble for saying this,
because this, my program is assisted by
the Cabinet Office of Japan,
but they don't restrict me in whatever I would say,
so I can say whatever I want, but they're using this,
like a double track diplomacy, that Putin is rather soft,
and he hints that there might be some breakthrough,
but at the foreign minister level, there's Labrov, right?
He's the, the true, he's the, and he was the ambassador
when I was working at, he was the Russian ambassador
when I was working at the UN, as a junior officer.
And he is really tricky, really tough,
and his position that he conveys to the Japanese counterpart
foreign minister is always tough.
We're not gonna give you, give back the islands.
You know, the peace treaty is first.
So, it's a very mixed message, and it seems like
Prime Minister Abe is totally relying on
President Putin's message, but you know,
we're not sure where that's going.
And you know, that's why I haven't really mentioned it.
I'm not saying it's unimportant, but I don't know
what's going on behind the scenes.
I don't think anything is going behind the scenes.
It seems like we're being manipulated by the Russian side,
but who knows?
But in general, I think it is people are interested
in that subject, but, and because it's a territorial issue,
it's about national sovereignty,
and it is always important, but it isn't as emotional
as some other issues, like the abduction
or the, you know, Senkaku Island,
which is the island in the East China Sea,
where we're having some difficulty with China.
So, I couldn't really answer your question
in any crisp way, but that's how--
- [Attendee] But it's mainly limited to that issue, then?
- Oh, you mean vis a vis Russia?
(muttering response)
There are some potential, I mean,
compared to, you know, other sort of Western democracies
in Europe, we have a rather stable relations,
except for this territorial issue,
and some see a positive possibility with development
in the bilateral relations with Russia.
So that is a bit different, and we were always nervous
about Japan being criticized by the US for being
too close to Russia, but now you have a president who
seems to, (chuckling) who seems to favor President Putin.
- So we have time for one more question.
And Robert, you had your hand up?
- So I just wanted to talk about something
that's been in the news recently, the North Korean
nuclear negotiations, and I'm wondering,
from a Japanese perspective, is there a fear
that in negotiating with Kim, Trump may,
for instance, say we'll accept giving up ICBMs,
but leave intermediate range and short range missiles
and leave the threat to Japan?
So is there a concern that the US may bypass Japan
in these negotiations, and what would the Japanese response
or policy be?
- Well, precisely the point you mentioned is
the serious concern, you know, the mid
and short-range missiles would be taken off the table.
And only sort of ICBMs being the, you know,
discussed, that's a huge concern.
But I guess that we would keep on demanding, you know,
the American sort of team, and Mr. Trump,
for that matter, I think Prime Minister Abe
is going to talk with Mr. Trump on the phone
before the bilateral between Kim Jong Un,
and I think he's gonna demand that point,
abduction issue, and don't back off on sort of the, ah,
the nuclear disarmament, you know?
That that's gonna, we're going to press that request
strongly I guess, but in a case where he doesn't,
I think we're not going to overreact.
We were under the threat of a, you know,
North Korean short and middle range missiles
for what, more than, close to 20 years, right, now?
We've somehow managed, so I think it's upon us
to negotiate with the North Koreans,
and I think Prime Minister Abe has shown
his willingness to negotiate with the North Koreans.
It's going to be a difficult process, I don't think
it's gonna happen right away, so I think,
Japanese government is supposed to be,
supposed to be, and I'm sure they are,
fully informed about what they've discussed.
They've already had a, you know, a high-level,
trilateral meeting in Seoul about what's
being discussed in Pyongyang.
And I'm sure they're getting the feel of it,
but the thing is, you know, who knows what President Trump
is going to agree with Kim Jung Un, so,
we're ready for it, we hope that, you know,
the US sticks to the message, but if it doesn't,
I mean, we, I guess our attitude is that
we have to take up the issue on our own.
So that part is a bit different from China,
because that is something that we could, alright?
So yeah, that's the real answer.
- So I have one last, quick question.
I have found from dealing with people in my alliance mafia,
I guess, that everybody has a really interesting
and often wonderful story about how they got interested
in Japan and vice-versa, and so I went to high school,
when I was in high school,
I went to Japan with my jazz band.
And so that's how I got interested in Japan, and here I am!
So I wanna ask you what your story is.
I know you were an exchange student in the United States.
- I was, yeah, well I lived in the US before that,
in the '70s, but that was when I was in elementary school.
So I do remember, but it didn't have as significant
an impact on me, but when I was in high school,
it was almost, I had no choice, I had to go,
because my mother kept on insisting that you have
to go to the United States, to brush up my English.
Since I was in elementary school,
I did catch the pronunciation,
but I didn't have the vocabulary and the skill,
so I decided to go, well, I was forced to go,
and I didn't have any choice where to go,
and I was sent to South Dakota, Watertown, South Dakota.
I was just there a couple months ago.
- [Moderator] I'm sure every young
Tokyo lad dreams of going there.
(laughing)
- And you know, the population then was like 16,000,
16, one-six, thousand,
and it was the third biggest city in South Dakota,
and you know, now my family was a Reagan Democrat,
an avid hunter, deeply religious,
and you know, I had to wear, I wore a Nike sneaker,
but they told me: that's not what you wear around here.
And so I got cowboy boots, but the thing is,
I didn't have boot-cut jeans, right?
So I tucked my jeans in the cowboy boot,
and my friends started calling me Ben, right?
I didn't understand why.
After I got, I mean, I got friends with them,
there's this muscle thing, the Ben-gay,
so tucking in the, and this was the 1980s,
or early 1980s, South Dakota.
And a kid from Tokyo with cowboy boots,
tucking his jeans in the boot,
and I told them my favorite pop star is Prince,
because he was from Minneapolis, I thought all the kids
there would like it, but Prince was totally out
of their taste, right?
It was like their favorite band was like Alabama
and Willie Nelson, and like, Prince is no way.
- [Moderator] So I'm really seeing how you were so drawn
to the US, based on this picture. (laughing)
- So it was almost like anthropology, right?
It wasn't a political science mindset.
It was more of an anthropology.
- The puzzle to be studied.
- So in a way, Trump brought me back to that time.
That we have to understand, right?
- Well, I think that's exactly the place
where we should end this tonight.
Thank you so much for joining us.
(applauding)
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