We must closely monitor changes in the global balance of power and the military-political situation, primarily near Russia's borders,
as well as in strategically important regions that have key significance for our security.
This also concerns the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, where a high potential for conflicts persists,
as well as Europe, where NATO and the United States continue to rapidly build up their infrastructure.
As you know, NATO and the United States have recently outlined their defence strategy.
It is an offensive strategy, to put it in diplomatic language, and in military language it would be called aggressive.
We need to take this into account during our practical work.
Let's be clear: this is offensive infrastructure that is being created in Europe.
This is about violations of provisions of the 1987 INF Treaty by the United States, unfortunately.
Many in this audience are well aware of what I am talking about.
For example, multipurpose missile launchers have already been deployed in Romania, and are being deployed in Poland, as part of the missile defence system.
Formally, they are deployed for interceptor missiles, but the point is, and experts are well aware of this, they are multipurpose units.
They can be used to launch existing sea-based cruise missiles with a range of 2,500 kilometres and,
in that case, they cease to be sea-based missiles, and can easily be moved to land.
That is, anti-missile launchers can, at any time, become units for medium-range cruise missiles.
Another example: target missiles used by the United States for testing anti-ballistic missile systems are identical to medium- and shorter-range ballistic missiles.
They are already there and are operational.
Their production in the United States may indicate the development of technologies outlawed by the INF Treaty.
Also, the Pentagon received funds for creating a mobile ground-based missile system with a range of up to 5,500 kilometres in 2018.
Thus, the United States is, in fact, working towards violating the INF Treaty.
They never stop looking for some kind of violation on our part, while consistently engaging in violations themselves,
just like they consistently and persistently sought to pull out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which, eventually, as we know, they did in a unilateral manner.
Of course, this significantly reduces the level of security in Europe and the world in general.
We have the sovereign right and every capability to respond adequately and rapidly to such potential threats.
If necessary, please promptly prepare and submit substantiated proposals on adjusting military planning documents seeking to improve the level of our country's defence capabilities.
Second, our new State Armament Programme will get underway next year.
We discussed its key features in May and November at our meetings in Sochi and numerous meetings in Moscow.
A special emphasis must be made on equipping troops with high-precision air, land and sea weapons, unmanned airstrike complexes,
and individual equipment for servicemen, as well as advanced reconnaissance, communication and electronic warfare systems.
It is necessary to ensure efficient, smooth implementation of the plans from the very first months.
Obviously, we will continuously monitor this process as we did with the previous armament programme.
Third, as I noted we are detecting further attempts to upset strategic parity by deploying the global missile defence system
and conventional attack systems that are comparable to nuclear weapons.
In terms of strike power and accuracy, they are hardly inferior to nuclear arms.
What are they designed for?
I believe they serve only one purpose, blackmail, because they create the illusion of a potential unpunished strike.
Today our nuclear forces reliably ensure strategic deterrence but we must develop them further.
By the end of 2017 the share of modern weapons in Russia's nuclear triad reached 79 percent and by 2021 they should be equipped with modern arms by up to 90 percent.
I am referring to missile systems that are capable of confidently overcoming existing and even projected missile defence systems.
Fourth, we must substantially enhance the mobility of our Armed Forces.
This concerns organisation of their logistics and supplies, and an ability to be promptly deployed and operate wherever national security demands.
It is essential to consolidate the potential of our Special Operations Forces.
I also request a review of the issue of equipping, the qualitative and quantitative strengthening of the Airborne Forces.
During next year's Vostok 2018 military exercises,
the Armed Forces should practice transferring a large group of personnel with ground equipment and aviation over several thousand kilometres and deploying it in new areas.
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